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Abstract
We estimate the demand value of road safety improvements in Switzerland from survey
data using a novel elicitation approach. Individuals’ responses to questions about how
much public spending on road safety should be increased are combined with observations
of income, tax rate, and road usage to estimate the economic value of a statistical
accident avoided. Information obtained from a risk-risk tradeoff elicitation allows us to
distinguish willingness-to-pay values for various degrees of accident severity. Our most
comprehensive estimate of the value of a statistical accident avoided amounts to CHF
11.0 million ($11.6 million); the corresponding value per statistical life is close to CHF
4.2 million ($4.5 million). We explore the sensitivity of these estimates to anchoring
and other framing effects and find that the popularity of specific road safety programs
is influenced by both the availability of different choice options and the provision of
partisan cues expressing political endorsement or opposition.
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Introduction

The marginal rate of substitution between wealth and mortality risk—commonly referred
to as the value per statistical life (VSL)—is a major determinant of environmental, health,
and transport policies. For example, reductions in mortality risk account for more than
90% of quantified benefits of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, and the total value of
these benefits hinges on the VSL value assumed (Cropper et al. 2011). Similar observations
apply to drinking water regulations, road safety programs, and other areas of public safety
(Ashenfelter 2006). The policy relevance of the VSL is unambiguous: The larger the VSL,
the more likely is it that a new regulation passes the benefit-cost test (Shogren and Stamland
2002). That makes estimating the VSL a policy-relevant research enterprise.
VSL estimates have been obtained almost exclusively from hedonic-wage regressions
(Viscusi and Aldy 2003) and from conventional stated preference (SP) studies (Cropper et
al. 2011).1 In this paper, we propose a novel elicitation mechanism based on the demand
function approach pioneered by Bergstrom et al. (1982) and apply it to estimating the VSL
in the context of road safety. The key idea of our approach is that people indicate a preferred
quantity-price bundle from a realistic safety production function. This enables us to elicit
people’s willingness to contribute to the provision of a public good without asking them
to consider counterfactual costs. Instead, a respondent is confronted with the individual
cost that they would incur if their preferred policy option was actually implemented. As
we will show, this largely reduces incentives for strategic answers—a well-known problem of
contingent valuation and other SP methods (Kling et al. 2012).
Although the demand function approach is theoretically appealing, it is no panacea.
The most important issues that remain relate to the stability of preferences. We address these
issues in our empirical application by incorporating a 2◊2-treatment design that enables us
1

A small number of studies have applied the hedonic approach to estimate the VSL outside the labor
market. For instance, Gayer et al. (2000) looked at housing market evidence near superfund sites to infer the
VSL. Ashenfelter and Greenstone (2004) exploited differences in mandated speed limits on rural and urban
roads to measure the VSL.
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to explore the sensitivity of WTP estimates for various health endpoints to anchoring and
other framing effects. The first treatment is an anchoring experiment in the spirit of Green
et al. (1998), which allows us to gauge preference variance across the split samples. We
find respondents to be inadequately sensitive to the actual cost of providing the public good,
suggesting that their preferences for road safety are inherently constructive and susceptible
to arbitrary pieces of information (Ariely et al. 2003). The second treatment provides half of
the respondents with partisan cues, offering them a substitute for the range of political views
and opinions they would have encountered in an actual voting process. This allows us to test
how genuine preferences for public safety are. The experimental provision of partisan cues
affected preference statements of those subjects sympathizing with right-wing parties which
had earlier voted in Parliament against the expansion of road safety programs, whereas it
had no detectable effect on supporters of left-wing and center parties.
In a nutshell, our findings suggest that the avoidance of one statistical accident—a road
accident that causes an average number of fatalities, disabilities, and injuries as recorded in
the Swiss accident statistics—is valued at CHF 11.0 million.2 Using a risk-risk tradeoff
elicitation task similar to that of Magat et al. (1996), we provide a breakdown into WTP
values for various degrees of accident severity. Our most comprehensive estimates imply a
VSL of CHF 4.2 million, a value per statistical disability case of CHF 1.7 million, and values
per statistical injury of CHF 0.2 million, CHF 23,000 and CHF 1,350 per severe, moderate
and mild case, respectively. We use a number of controls in our reduced-form regressions to
explore the impact of risk perception on the stated WTP for the provision of road safety.
Other drivers of the demand for road safety are altruistic preferences, political orientation,
educational attainment, income, and road usage. While these findings resonate well with
economic theory, we find that respondents who evaluated a less extensive subset of road
safety programs were willing to pay 38% less than those who evaluated a more extensive
subset. Similarly, the provision of partisan cues reduced the WTP by about 20% on average.
2

At the time of survey conduct, one Swiss franc (CHF) corresponded to $1.06.
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These treatment effects highlight the importance of context and frames in decisions
about public good provisions. On first thought, they might be interpreted to corroborate
doubts as to whether hypothetical valuation methods can provide robust information to
policy makers (Kahneman et al. 1999; Hausman 2012). On second thought they are not so
surprising, however. It is well known that decisions, whether hypothetical or not, are often
influenced by arbitrary anchors (Tversky and Kahneman 1974, Ariely et al. 2003), available
choice options (Stewart et al. 2003), choice bracketing (Menon et al. 1997, Read et al.
1999), and the relative position of options within a choice set (Tversky and Simonson 1993;
Drolet et al. 2000). As Kamenica (2008) demonstrates, context and frames may provide
payoff-relevant information to decision makers. For example, the information implicit in a
firm’s offer of a particular set of goods allows the uninformed consumer to infer from the
product line which good is optimal for them. Likewise, the undecided voter draws inferences
from contextual information which may let them intentionally violate naïve formulations of
standard choice theory.
However one wants to interpret context and framing effects in SP studies, there is
no reason to believe that VSL estimates from labor market studies would necessarily offer
better policy guidance. Indeed, the analysis of compensating wage differentials has several
drawbacks mostly related to the fact that workers vary across typically unobserved dimensions
such as productivity type (Hwang et al. 1992), skills (Shogren and Stamland (2002), and risk
preferences (DeLeire et al. 2013). A number of econometric remedies have been developed to
address the resulting biases in the estimation of the VSL.3 However, these approaches require
fine-grained occupational risk data. Even if such data is available and the above problems
can be overcome, several conceptual problems remain.
These include the fact that hedonic techniques ignore effects on the quality of life as well
as other-regarding safety preferences, both of which are important aspects of public safety
3

These include panel data estimations that control for fixed effects of job switchers (Black and Kniesner
2003; Kniesner et al. 2012), quantile regression models that address heterogeneity in risk across workers in
the same industry (Evans and Schaur 2010; Kniesner et al. 2010), and Roy models to correct for sorting
biases (DeLeire et al. 2013).
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interventions. Even more important is the question how well wage-risk tradeoffs observed in
the labor market proxy for the preferences of the general population. Observed wage-risk
decisions are predominantly made by male, blue-collar workers aged 20 to 65. Transferring
VSL estimates obtained from this specific subgroup to the general population requires strong
assumptions about the underlying homogeneity of societal preferences for safety.
For this reason, health, environmental and transport economists have increasingly
turned to SP approaches to infer the economic value of risk reductions from survey questions about the allocation of private or public good provisions. Private good scenarios allow
researchers to examine WTP for reduction in own risk by offering goods that are strictly
private and reasonably familiar (Beattie et al. 1998). In most cases, such choices involve
small probabilities that respondents may find difficult to evaluate in a meaningful manner
(Baron 1997; Kunreuther et al. 2001). Unsurprisingly, SP studies that estimate the VSL
based on small risk reductions are often insensitive to the absolute size of the risk reduction
(Hammitt and Graham 1999). In other words, respondents are willing to pay nearly the same
amount for reductions in risk that differ by an order of magnitude or more (Andersson et al.
2016).
A popular way to overcome the problem of ill-understood probabilities is to provide
respondents with visual aids to make them better understand the baseline risk and the risk
reduction under consideration. Corso et al. (2001) found that respondents made WTP statements nearly proportional to the size of risk reduction when presented with an array of dots
representing different reductions in risk. They contemplated that the dots visualized risk in
a frequency format, which psychologists have found to be more accessible than small probabilities. While visual aids may certainly help in communicating risks to respondents, this
does not help to address the problem of unfamiliarity—even if nicely displayed, a 1 : 10, 000
reduction in mortality risk remains an abstract benefit likely to be interpreted differently by
different people.
Questions involving expected numbers of deaths or injuries avoided may be easier for
5

respondents to process, but imply the elicitation of preferences for safety as a public good.
The valuation of public good provisions with SP methods bears a number of additional
problems. First, choice tasks involving public good scenarios and changes in tax rates are
often cognitively more demanding than choices over private goods (List and Gallet 2001).
Second, randomly assigned bids may be incredible (Flores and Strong 2007) and especially
so, if the proposed policy is to be financed through typical sources of tax revenues. Third,
respondents might answer strategically if the survey choices are believed to be consequential
(Green et al. 1998).4 And fourth, stated contributions to a public good may be driven by
the private value a person receives from contributing to a worthy cause beyond use value.
While such warm glow motives are one of many pro-social behaviors that may lead people
to contribute to a public good (Kling et al. 2012), they need to be carefully considered in
order for SP studies not to confound private and social values (Bergstrom 2006).
Our elicitation mechanism addresses most of the above issues. The approach derives
VSL estimates from people’s preferred quantities of road safety interventions rather than from
CV referendum questions. Incentives for strategic misrepresentations are minimized since
the bid amounts are knotted to personal taxes and mileages driven and respondents receive
accurate information about the marginal cost of an additional unit of risk reduction and their
personal contribution to its provision. We frame the choices over quantity-price bundles
as a multiple proposal ballot—one form of referendum in Switzerland’s direct-democratic
system—allowing respondents to reveal their WTP for public safety in a meaningful and
realistic way and provides a link between the hypothetical vote and the subjective probability
that a specific program will be adopted. It also mitigates problems related to the perception
of small changes in risk, because respondents evaluate programs that are characterized by
4

In the public good context, incentive problems with single binary choice CV questions arise from the
random assignment of bids, which are often different from the respondent’s contribution were the policy to
be implemented (Schläpfer 2017). The experimental design implies there be some respondents who pay no
income tax at all, but face the highest bid. If these respondents are in favor of the project, they have an
incentive for approval at ‘any price’ (Flores and Strong 2007). Vice versa, people who contribute a lot to
the tax revenue of a community have an incentive to downplay their true WTP (Rheinberger and Schläpfer
2015).
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the expected number of fatalities and injuries avoided per year. In other words, quantities of
the public good under consideration are clearly defined, which eliminates the potential bias
that arises when some respondents focus on the risk of dying, while others also consider the
risk of getting injured.
In Section 2, we embed the proposed mechanism for eliciting the demand for public
safety in microeconomic theory. Section 3 contains a description of the survey instrument
and the data used in the empirical part. In Section 4, we outline our empirical strategy.
Section 5 reports the main findings of our study and the results of validity and robustness
checks and section 6 concludes with a brief discussion of the implications of our results for
future research and policy applications.

2

Theoretical Model

Demand for safety is typically measured by the compensating variation c that makes an
individual indifferent between facing risk p0 at wealth level w0 and facing the reduced risk
p1 = p0 ≠

at the lower wealth level w1 = w0 ≠ c (Pratt and Zeckhauser 1996). The

standard model readily applies to private valuations of risk reductions. Road safety, however,
is better characterized as a public good because the risk faced by the individual driver or
passenger is determined through regulations and other governmental interventions financed
from tax revenue. Moreover, no road user, whether contributing or not, can be excluded
from improvements in safety. Below, we extend the standard VSL model to account for the
public good context.

2.1

Demand for Public Safety

Consider an individual i who earns income Yi and receives Q units of risk reduction (that is Q
fewer road accidents) at a per unit tax price P . The individual’s utility is a non-decreasing,
quasi-concave function of the collective good Q, and the quantities (Q1 , . . . , Qm ) and prices
7

(P1 , . . . , Pm ) of m private goods, which implies the following set of demand equations:

Qúj = gj (P1 , ..., Pm , Yi ≠ P Q, Q)

j = 1, ..., m.

(1)

Each of the conditional demand functions gj in Eq. (1) is subject to the budget constraint
Yi ≠ P Q > 0, and individual i’s optimal but unobserved amount of the collective good is
given by Qú = h(P1 , . . . , Pm , P ú , Yi ).

Because the amount of safety that each individual receives is fixed, the conditional
demand functions meet all requirements of ordinary demand functions (Pollack 1969). We
may hence substitute them into the individual’s utility function to evaluate alternative levels
of safety provision. Individual i prefers a road safety program A over another program
B if vi (Yi ≠ P A QA , QA ) > vi (Yi ≠ P B QB , QB ). When faced with a choice between several

alternatives, the individual chooses the road safety program that is utility maximizing. Under
the assumptions spelled out below such choices provide sufficient information to estimate the
individual’s WTP per unit of risk reduction.
As we seek to estimate the demand value for road safety in Switzerland, we frame the
task as a multiple proposal ballot. The ballot proposes five alternative road safety programs,
A–E, that avoid successively more accidents at an increasing marginal cost. This assumption
is legitimate since efficient safety provision requires that accidents be avoided where avoidance
is least costly. Second, we assume that WTP per unit of risk reduction is constant over the
range of risk examined in the survey. The latter assumption is consistent with the theoretical
result that, for small risk reductions, WTP should be nearly proportional to the change in risk
(Hammitt and Graham 1999). Figure 1 illustrates the resulting safety production function.
Based on these assumptions, we designed a survey that required a discrete choice from
among five different road safety programs including the status quo. Each of these programs
Ó

Ô

represents a distinct quantity-price pair Qk , P k , and the differences between two consecutive pairs determine the implied value of a statistical accident avoided. The benefits of
avoiding statistical accidents are described to the respondent in terms of the number of pre8

Figure 1: Safety production function.

Note: The safety production function was used to construct the respondent-specific cost of each of the
offered road safety programs. The actual cost to the respondent was determined based on the calculus
presented in the Appendix.

vented fatalities (F ), disability cases (D), and serious (S), moderate (M ), and minor (O)
Ó

injuries, respectively. The vector Qk = F k , Dk , S k , M k , Ok

Ô

summarizes the benefits ex-

pected from the program k. Table 1 lists the properties of each of the road safety programs
proposed to the respondents.
One major concern with SP studies is that respondents might over- or understate their
WTP—either to help induce or hinder the provision of the public good (Green et al. 1998),
or because the respondent believes their actual cost would differ from the cost stated in the
survey (Flores and Strong 2007). In order to minimize strategic incentives and to enhance
survey credibility, we carefully described the designated funding mechanism and amended
the information in Table 1 with estimates of the respondent’s actual cost expected from the
implementation of any of the proposed road safety programs. These actual cost estimates,
denoted Cik , were derived based on the respondent’s income tax and mileage driven in the

9

Table 1: Summary of the proposed road safety programs.
Road Safety Programs
Fatalities avoided
Disabilities avoided
Severe injuries avoided
Moderate injuries avoided
Mild injuries avoided

A

B

C

D

E

10
12
200
300
2,000

20
24
400
600
4,000

30
36
600
900
6,000

40
48
800
1,200
8,000

50
60
1,000
1,500
10,000

previous year.5
If a respondent assigns a positive probability ⁄ to the consequentiality of the response,
they should maximize the expected payoff function:
E [ﬁi ] =

ÿ1
k

2

Ễi ≠ Cik ⁄

n (1 ≠

1

k
i (k)) + 1 y Ø Ci

n+1

2

,

(2)

where Ễi is the true, but unobserved WTP linked to the optimal amount of safety provision
Qú ,

i

denotes the CDF of i’s belief about the approval rate of program k by the other

n respondents, and 1(.) is an indicator of whether the respondent approves program k by
accepting to make a contribution y at least as large as Cik (Green et al. 1998).
It is straightforward to see that the expected payoff is maximized at Ễi = y, leading
rational respondents to reveal their true preferences. Different to the common multiple
ballot (Gibbard 1973; Satterthwaite 1975), there is no incentive for “favorite betrayal” here.
Consider a respondent who envisions a close race between the competing programs k and
k + 1. She prefers the most expensive program K, implying the preferential order K º . . . º
k + 1 º k º . . . 0 (with º denoting a strict preference). It would not make sense for her to
vote for the “lesser evil”, i.e. program k + 1, since truthful voting reveals her latent WTP:
Ễi > Cik+1 > Cik .6
5

Details on the derivation of Cik are provided in Table 6 of the Appendix.
Respondents may still misreport their WTP if they believe that the aggregated WTP rather than plurality
determines how much of the public good is provided. Even in that case, the individualized cost vector reduces
strategic misrepresentations as any respondent’s answers have very limited leverage power.
6
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One conceivable aspect of this type of preference inquiry is that respondents might not
only consider their own reduction in risk, but also care about the reduction in risk to others.
Moreover, they might not only consider their own contribution to the provision of public
safety, but also those of others. This brings up a series of questions related to altruism in the
valuation of public goods (Bergstrom 2006). In the empirical analysis, we include a number
of regressors to control for altruistic preferences with regard to risk and wealth.

2.2

Risk-Risk Tradeoffs

The framework outlined above does not permit to directly estimate the VSL or the WTP for
avoiding a statistical case of disability or injury. Rather, we obtain estimates of the economic
value per statistical accident avoided (VSA). The VSA is a composite WTP metric reflecting
that, for every road fatality avoided, program k avoids 1.2 cases of permanent disability,
and 20, 30, and 200 cases of severe, moderate, and minor injuries, respectively.7 We use
the reference lottery metric introduced by Magat et al. (1996) to tease out the VSL and
the WTP values for the other health endpoints. With this preference elicitation technique
different health risks are traded off against each other, so that ultimately all impacts can be
converted into death risk equivalents.
For illustration, take the tradeoff between road fatalities and accident-caused cases of
disability. We asked respondents to choose between two regions, a and b, which differ only in
the number of road fatalities (F a vs. F b ) and disability cases (Da vs. Db ) per 100,000 people.
Let F b > F a and Da > Db and suppose the respondent is an expected utility maximizer.
She will be indifferent between regions a and b, if and only if
pa u(F a ) + q a u(Da ) + (1 ≠ pa ≠ q a )u(1) = pb u(F b ) + q b u(Db ) + (1 ≠ pb ≠ q b )u(1),

(3)

where p• = F • /100, 000 and q • = D• /100, 000 are the probabilities to meet with a fatal and
7

These figures are based on confidential accident statistics of the Swiss Federal Roads Office.
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a disabiliating accident, respectively. The utility from not having an accident is denoted by
u(1). If we normalize the utility of death to zero, Eq. (3) can be re-stated as:

µFD © (1 ≠

u(D)
pb ≠ pa
Dp
)= a
=
.
b
u(1)
q ≠q
Dq

(4)

Eq. (4) states that the percentage degradation in the utility of full health caused by a
disabiliating accident equals the ratio between the death risk difference
risk difference

p and the disability

q. Given the equality in Eq. (3), this ratio equals the marginal rate of

substitution µFD between fatality and disability risk. By varying the values of pa and q b
across respondents, location choices between regions a and b provide sufficient information
S
M
to identify µFD , and similarly µD
S , µM , and µO (Van Houtven et al. 2008). Based on the

marginal rates of substitution between the different health endpoints, we may then convert
the VSA into the VSL and the corresponding WTP values.

3

Data

Our study implements the demand function approach using a computer-based survey in which
respondents choose among different road safety programs that reduce a specified number of
car accidents at a marginally increasing cost. We used a pivot design (Rose et al. 2008)
to make the cost of each program contingent upon the respondent’s income tax and road
usage. Choices among these programs are the basis for estimating the VSA. Respondents
then moved on to the location-choice task, based on which we elicit the marginal rates of
substitution between various health endpoints.
Next, we briefly describe the survey instrument, the allocation of treatments, and the
sample from which data were obtained.
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3.1

Survey Instrument

The survey instrument was developed in close collaboration with the Swiss Association of
Traffic and Road Experts. The development phase spanned nine months and included the
development of realistic road safety programs based on official and confidential road accident
data and expert information about the cost of various safety interventions, the development
of the choice tasks outlined below, a confirmatory workshop with traffic experts, and pretests
with a convenience sample. In an iterative process, the survey instrument was refined after
each step. The final survey consisted of five parts.
The introductory part screened out non-target persons so as to attain target quotas for
age, gender, occupational status, and primary language. We informed respondents that the
survey was commissioned by research of the Federal Roads Office and explained its general
objectives. We asked them to carefully consider the questions, emphasized that there were no
wrong answers, guaranteed anonymity, and pointed out that their responses will eventually
inform policymakers.
Part two presented a summary of the prevailing accident risk on Swiss roads, possible
programs to reduce the number of accidents and corresponding costs. Respondents had access
to this information at any time via a hyperlink. We detailed out that any such program would
be financed through a mix of automobile, income and fuel taxes and inquired about the
respondent’s last tax invoice and the mileage driven in the previous year. Respondents were
then asked to compare four different road safety programs to the status quo situation. The
programs differed in terms of numbers of fatalities and injuries avoided, the social cost, and
the individual cost contribution. A cheap-talk script reminded respondents of their budget
constraint (Cummings and Taylor 1999) and, depending on the experimental condition, they
had access to partisan cues as a decision aid. The actual choice task proceeded in two
steps. Respondents first evaluated each of the four programs against the status quo. They
were instructed to consider each comparison as independent ballot on the adoption of the
corresponding program. If a respondent approved more than one program, they were asked
13

to choose the preferred one.
In part three, we asked respondents how certain they were about their decisions, how
much time they had spent studying the information and whether they had considered the
partisan cues (if applicable). Moreover, respondents expressed on a scale from 0 = ‘own safety
only’ to 10 = ‘public safety only’ their safety attitudes. They then indicated those factors on
a multiple-item list that they had considered when making their choices. In another rating
question, respondents expressed their opinions about the current provision of road safety
using a scale from 0 (‘far too much’) to 10 (‘way too little’). A series of further questions
inquired about their risk perception, risky behavior, and other traffic-related attitudes.
Part four included the location choice task outlined in Section 2, which we largely
adapted from van Houtven et al. (2008). At the outset of the task respondents received
detailed road accident statistics including the annual number of accidents leading to death,
disability, and injuries of three severity grades specified according to the definition of the Swiss
Federal Road Office. In order to enable the evaluation of the risk-risk tradeoffs in a meaningful
way, we listed 2012 accidents in each category and presented visual risk representations. Each
respondent then faced four location choices between regions a and b that corresponded to
tradeoffs between F and D, D and S, S and M , and M and O. These tradeoffs varied across
respondents to enable the elicitation of marginal rates of substitution between the health
endpoints. We allocated the risk-risk tradeoffs according to the following three premises:
1. The expected number of respondents is close to one thousand;
2. Four marginal rates of substitution have to be elicited; and
3. Risk-risk tradeoffs ought to be consistent with empirically observed WTP values.
Respondents evaluated 16 scenarios (four per risk-risk tradeoff) spanning a wide range of
WTP values broadly consistent with the health economics literature. To keep the cognitive burden at a reasonable level, we constructed a fractional factorial design of 40 risk-risk
tradeoff combinations, which we split into four questions per respondent using an orthogonal
14

blocking factor. The survey instrument randomly allocated the ten choice sets to the respondents. Following Van Houtven et al. (2008), we framed the task as location choice between
two regions and emphasized that it was unrelated to the previous program choices and did
not involve any cost.
In the last part of the survey, we collected information on the usual socio-economic
characteristics along with indications of political orientation, general interest in politics, and
participation in national and regional ballots.

3.2

Sample

The survey was fielded in September 2014 to a stratified sample of the LINK Internet panel,
a 130,000 member nationally representative web-based sample of the Swiss population aged
15 to 74. Stratification was based on age, gender, and primary language. 1,007 of 2,022 panel
members, who initially accepted to participate, completed the survey for a response rate of
just under 50%. Among the dropouts, 337 members were excluded either because they did
not enjoy voting rights or because the respective quota was already filled. Table 2 suggests
that the socio-economic characteristics of our sample reasonably follow the distribution of
the Swiss adult population except for the deliberately oversampled proportions of French and
Italian speakers, participants aged 70 (who are under-sampled by construction of the panel),
and the educational attainment which is larger in our sample than in the Swiss population.

15

Table 2: Sample statistics and representativeness.
Variable
Age

Value or level
Sample (%)
Population (%)
18-34
28.5
25
35-54
38.6
34
55-69
27.3
28
70 or older
5.6
13
Gender
Male
47.9
48
Female
52.1
52
Region
German speaking
64.7
74
French speaking
25.1
21
Italian speaking
10.2
5
Work status
Working (part-time)
60.8
63
Not working
39.2
37
Education
Basic secondary
4.9
19
Higher secondary
52.4
54
Tertiary
42.8
27
Income (CHF/months)
Less than 4,000
36.7
22
4,001-6,000
25.2
33
6,001-8,000
18.0
23
8,001-10,000
11.4
12
10,001-12,000
5.0
5
> 12,000
3.7
5
Political party support
BDP (center-right)
7
5
CVP (center)
10
15
EVP (center-left)
4
1
FDP (center-right)
17
15
GPS (left)
8
8
GLP (center)
9
6
SVP (right)
23
29
SP (left)
23
23
Note: n = 1, 007; population statistics are retrieved from the following official sources: STATPOP
register data; survey of household structure; survey of income and living conditions; results of 2011
elections for national council; year 2010 traffic census.

3.3

Treatment Allocation

We built two experimental factors into the study design, which enable us exploring the sensitivity of WTP responses to anchoring and endorsement effects. In what is essentially a variant
of the Green et al. (1998) anchoring experiment, we randomly allocated respondents to two
survey versions. Half of respondents evaluated road safety programs A–D, while the other
16

half evaluated programs B–E. Approval of one of the programs implied aggregated marginal
WTP values corresponding to CHF 3 to 24 million and CHF 6 to 48 million per statistical
accident avoided, respectively. Respondents could also choose the status quo rejecting any
contribution. If preferences are stable, then roughly the same number of respondents should
prefer program C under both treatment conditions. Moreover, WTP estimates should differ
because of boundary effects only. Else the valuation is affected by anchoring effects and the
stated preferences, albeit internally coherent, are unstable (Ariely et al. 2003).
To investigate the effect of partisan cues on the stability of WTP responses, we randomly allocated half of the respondents to a treatment group that received the tally of the
parliamentary vote on the road safety program Via sicura, which was similar in scope and
cost to the proposed program A.8 This type of framing experiment has been frequently used
in political sciences to explore the genuineness of voter preferences (e.g., Druckman 2001;
Taber and Lodge 2006; Slothuus and de Vreese 2010). The provision of partisan cues seizes
on the idea that preferences for public goods emerge from interactions between individuals
and their social environment (Druckman and Lupia 2000). Accordingly, one way of helping
people make choices that are consistent with their preferences is the provision of information about peer preferences (Akerlof and Cranton 2010). Partisan cues are perhaps the best
possible example. If safety preferences are inherent and stable, then the provision of such
contextual information should not affect the respondent’s valuation; on the contrary, if safety
preferences are socially constructed, then a respondent should be more likely to follow the
advice of their endorsed political party.
In order to control for potential interaction between the two treatments, we used a survey design that orthogonally crossed the two experimental factors and allocated respondents
in rotation. This resulted in four balanced treatment samples, which showed no differences
with regard to socio-economic characteristics and response time.
8

The Via sicura initiative was approved by the Swiss Parliament in 2012. Treated respondents received
the vote tally and were referred to the similar scope of this initiative and the proposed program A (low anchor
condition) or they were told that the Via sicura initiative is comparable in scope to a program half the size
of program B (high anchor condition).
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4

Empirical Strategy

This section describes our empirical strategy to estimate the VSA and to derive the WTP
metrics for the specific health endpoints associated with road accidents. We first consider
the choices over road safety programs, before we turn to the estimation of the marginal rates
of substitution between the different health endpoints.

4.1

Analysis of Program Choices

The program choice task involves tradeoffs between road safety programs that offer a decreasing number of accidents at an increasing cost. The choice of a program k can be framed
in terms of the additional number of accidents avoided
responding additional cost

k+1
i Ck

Qk+1
= Qk+1 ≠ Qk and the cork

= Cik+1 ≠ Cik to be incurred by respondent i. If the

respondent were indifferent between the two programs k + 1 and k, their WTP for avoiding one statistical accident would just equal the risk-money tradeoff: Êi =

Qk+1
k /

k+1
.
i Ck

The expression of indifference was not possible in our task, however. Respondents had to
choose their preferred program, providing us with bounds on their latent WTP similar to the
double-bounded dichotomous choice format (Carson and Hanemann 2005). Assume respondent i chooses program k. This choice implies Êik+1 > Ễi Ø Êik , meaning that i’s unobserved
WTP, Ễi , is contained in the closed interval [Êik , Êik+1 ). The choice of the largest program K
and the status quo imply the intervals [ÊiK , Œ) and [0, Êi1 ), respectively.

The appropriate technique to address double-censored data is interval regression. The

resulting coefficient estimates are interpretable in the same way as OLS coefficients, enabling
us to estimate Ê̂i for each respondent i. If we assumed the WTP for public safety is normally
distributed, we could do so based on the untransformed intervals provided by the respondent’s
choice. However, negative WTP values as implied by the normal distribution are at odds
with economic theory. We therefore transform the intervals to [log Êik , log Êik+1 ), [log ÊiK , Œ)
and [≠Œ, log Êi1 ), respectively.
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4.2

Analysis of Location Choices

The analysis of the location choices is based on the binary choice framework proposed by
Cameron and James (1987). It exploits that, by varying the risk-risk tradeoff

© (pb ≠

pa )/(q a ≠ q b ) over subjects, one obtains information about the dispersion parameter ‡ of the

conditional distribution of the marginal rate of substitution µi between two health endpoints.
Assume that µi = — Õ Xi + Ái , where Xi is a vector of covariates. Each respondent faces a
randomly allocated
or less than

i.

i,

so that the choice for or against region b reveals whether µi is greater

For a normally distributed error term Ái , we can thus derive the probit

model:
Pr(yi = 1|Xi ) = Pr(µi >

i)

= 1 ≠ ((

i

≠ — Õ Xi )/‡).

(5)

As Cameron and James (1987) demonstrated, one can treat the risk-risk tradeoff as an
observable by appending the coefficient – on

i.

Then, –
ˆ will be a point estimate of ≠1/‡,

while the coefficient vector ◊ˆ will collect estimates of —/‡. Based on the vector estimates –
ˆ

ˆ it is trivial to obtain the corresponding estimate of the marginal rate of substitution:
and ◊,
µ̂i = –
ˆ ≠1 N ≠1

N
ÿ

◊ˆÕ Xi ,

(6)

i=1

where N is the number of respondents. One thing to keep in mind is, however, that each
respondent faced a series of four location choices pertaining to the tradeoffs between the
five health endpoints. Given the structure of the task, it is unlikely that choices by one
respondent are independent of each other. We therefore estimate a multivariate extension of
the Cameron-James model, assuming that the errors share a multivariate normal distribution.

4.3

Conversion of WTP Metrics

Once the individual marginal rates of substitution are estimated, we can convert into the
specific WTP metric for each of the different health endpoints by exploiting that:
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1

1

1

1

S
M
Ê̂i = ỄiF 1 + µ̂D
M + µ̂O
F D + µ̂D S + µ̂S
MO

2222

,

(7)

with µ̂xy = 1/µ̂yx . That is, we convert the non-fatal health outcomes of a statistical accident
into fatality equivalents and since all but the VSL parameter ỄiF in Eq. (7) are known, we
may simply solve for it. Estimates of ỄiD , ỄiS , ỄiM , and ỄiO are obtained in a similar way. One
practical issue is that the derivation involves the multiplication of several estimated variables.
In the empirical application, we use a pairs cluster bootstrap (Cameron and Miller 2015) to
estimate consistent confidence intervals around the derived WTP metrics.

5

Results

Perhaps the most intuitive way to present our results is by plotting the approval rate for
each of the five road safety programs against the implied VSA. Panel A of Figure 2 shows
this approval curve, suggesting that the endorsed median VSA is close to CHF 11 million,
respectively. Based on the response probability distribution to the individual bids, it is
possible to construct a WTP curve, which illustrates the fraction of respondents who are
willing to make a specific contribution per accident avoided (see Panel B of Figure 2). This
WTP curve is well-behaved in the sense that the fraction of respondents who are willing to
contribute more than a specific amount is rapidly declining so that the median contribution
for avoiding one additional statistical road accident is close to CHF 2.30.9

5.1

WTP for Avoiding a Statistical Accident

Next, we present regression-based estimates of the WTP for avoiding one statistical road
accident. As McFadden (1994) notes, there is no need to include covariates such as income,
age, or gender for estimating the mean or median WTP in a target population. However, we
9

Note that there is a close link to an aggregate demand curve, as the WTP curve depicts how demand
declines when the per unit price of the public good increases (Carson and Hanemann 2005).
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Figure 2: Approval of road safety programs.

Note: Lines indicate linear interpolations within the gray intervals.

seek to understand how risk perceptions, other-regarding preferences and other concomitant
factors affect the willingness to contribute to road safety. Table 3 provides a summary of the
variables included in the interval regression analysis.
Table 4 presents three models with different sets of explanatory variables. Model I
comprises the full set of covariates but omits the treatment effects. Yet, as the treatments
were randomly allocated, the omission does not affect the mean WTP estimate. The model
therefore mimics the analysis of a naïve researcher, who ignores that cognitive factors may
undermine the interpretation of stated preferences as “true” preferences. Indeed, the coefficient estimates of Model I resonate well with theoretical expectations. We observe neither
gender nor regional differences, suggesting that the ballot questions were posed in a neutral
way. Educational attainment, income, mileage driven and having children had the expected
positive impact on WTP. The first two factors make it cheaper in utility terms to spend
money on a public good, while the latter two factors make the provision of safety more
valuable to the respondent.
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Table 3: Summary of explanatory variables.
Variable
Definition
High anchor
Respondent evaluated programs B-E
Partisan cues
Respondent received partisan cues
Age
Age
Female
Female
French
French-speaking region
Italian
Italian-speaking region
Basic
Basic education
University
University education
Income group 2
Monthly income: CHF 4,001-6,000
Income group 3
Monthly income: CHF 6,001-8,000
Income group 4
Monthly income: CHF 8,001-10,000
Income group 5
Monthly income: > CHF 10,000
Children
Household with children
Rural
Rural community
Left
Political orientation: left
Right
Political orientation: right
Rail card
Owner of a rail card
Perceived risk
Perceived risk of road travel§
Uncertainty
Stated uncertainty about response
Completion time Time spent studying information (in minutes)§
Own safety
Own vs. others’ safety (on a scale from 0 to 10): <3
Others’ safety
Own vs. others’ safety (on a scale from 0 to 10): >7
Cost
Considered additional costs
Death
Considered own risk of death
Injury
Considered own risk of injury
Public safety
Considered public safety
Own driving
Considered own driving ability
Other driving
Considered driving ability of others
Donate
Respondent donated survey compensation
Never vote
Votes never or rarely
Mileage
Annual mileage driven (in 1,000 km)§
Note: § denotes mean-centered variables.
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n
1,007
1,007
1,007
1,007
1,007
1,007
1,007
1,007
996
996
996
996
1,007
1,007
992
992
1,007
994
1,007
1,007
1,007
1,007
1,007
1,007
1,007
1,007
1,007
1,007
1,007
1,007
1,006

Mean
0.49
0.50
46.5
0.52
0.25
0.10
0.03
0.44
0.26
0.18
0.12
0.09
0.39
0.25
0.31
0.39
0.62
0.00
0.24
0.00
0.01
0.13
0.69
0.43
0.45
0.56
0.36
0.43
0.30
0.06
0.00

SD
0.50
0.50
14.9
0.50
0.43
0.30
0.18
0.50
0.44
0.39
0.32
0.29
0.49
0.43
0.46
0.49
0.49
1.98
0.43
4.00
0.12
0.33
0.46
0.49
0.50
0.50
0.48
0.50
0.46
0.24
6.80

Min
0
0
18
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-4.1
0
-1.5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-8.1

Max
1
1
74
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
5.9
1
99.6
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
19.4

Table 4: Results of interval regression models.
Model I
Coef. z-stat
High anchor shown
Partisan cues provided
Treatment interaction
Age
0.006
2.09 **
Female
-0.014
-0.17
French
0.071
0.75
Italian
-0.091
-0.64
Basic
-0.261
-0.83
Tertiary
0.232
2.77 ***
Income group 2
0.173
1.79 *
Income group 3
0.250
2.38 **
Income group 4
0.268
1.90 *
Income group 5
0.269
1.53
Children
0.150
1.97 **
Rural
-0.142
-1.67 *
Left
0.161
1.68 *
Right
-0.176
-2.04 **
Traffic card
0.126
1.50
Travel risk
0.025
1.27
Uncertain
-0.309
-3.48 ***
Completion time
0.012
0.83
Own safety
-0.520
-1.36
Other safety
-0.092
-0.69
Additional cost
-0.277
-2.94 ***
Risk of death
0.388
4.47 ***
Risk of injury
0.327
3.86 ***
Public safety
0.580
7.71 ***
Own driving
-0.262
-3.16 ***
Other driving
0.169
2.17 **
Donate
0.266
3.23 ***
Never vote
-0.276
-1.67 *
Mileage
0.025
4.17 ***
Intercept
-0.634
-2.96 ***
Number of respondents
971
Log pseudo-likelihood
-1,473.6
McFadden’s R2
0.098
Note: Dependent variable is log(WTP) interval.

Model II
Coef. z-stat
0.487
4.18
-0.202
-1.66
0.041
0.25

Model III
Coef. z-stat
***
0.440
4.46
*
-0.240
-2.34
0.065
0.64
0.005
1.88
-0.020
-0.25
0.085
0.96
-0.108
-0.80
-0.300
-0.99
0.208
2.64
0.160
1.77
0.248
2.49
0.280
2.05
0.295
1.77
0.161
2.24
-0.148
-1.82
0.102
1.09
-0.201
-2.64
0.096
1.19
0.017
0.89
-0.304
-3.65
0.010
0.74
-0.506
-1.55
-0.116
-0.91
-0.295
-3.29
0.358
4.35
0.298
3.74
0.600
8.30
-0.253
-3.18
0.133
1.79
0.250
3.18
-0.311
-1.93
0.024
4.12
0.195
2.18 **
-0.612
-2.86
1,007
971
-1,671.3
-1,447.7
0.012
0.114
Significance levels: ‘***’ 0.01, ‘**’ 0.05, ‘*’ 0.1.

23

***
**
*

***
*
**
**
*
**
*
**

***

***
***
***
***
***
*
***
*
***
**

A number of perceptional factors are associated with a higher WTP for road safety.
These include the perceived risk of road travel in Switzerland measured on a scale from 0 (‘no
risk at all’) to (‘very high risk’) and further dummies indicating whether the respondent had
considered their own risk of dying or getting injured as well as their and other road users’
driving skills. We find also factors that are negatively associated with the stated WTP.
Political orientation had a significant effect with right-wing party supporters being willing
to pay roughly 20% less than supporters of centrist parties and 30% less than supporters of
left-wing parties. Respondents who were relatively uncertain about their choices expressed
a 30 percent points lower WTP than those who felt relatively certain about their answers.
Similarly, respondents who had considered their own driving skills stated a 25% lower WTP,
while those who had considered the driving skills of other road users stated a roughly 15%
higher WTP.
We included several covariates related to the altruistic preferences. Many of them have
statistically significant and large effects on the stated WTP. A respondent who considered
only their own safety and worried about additional costs that would accrue when adopting
one of the proposed road safety programs was willing to pay almost three times less than the
average respondent. On the other hand, a respondent who had considered safety as a public
good, and had donated the compensation for participating in the survey (about CHF 10) to
a charity organization was willing to pay more than twice as much as the average respondent.
These results underline that preferences for road safety are very heterogeneous and altruism
has a distinct impact on people’s preferences for road safety.

5.2

Aggregation of Individual-level WTP

We applied population weights as reported in Table 2 to aggregate the individual-level WTP
estimates. We then converted the obtained VSA estimates into WTP metrics for different
accident severity using the marginal rates of substitution between health endpoints that
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we derived from the risk-risk tradeoffs.10 Figure 3 reports the obtained mean value for
each of the WTP metrics as well as the corresponding 10-percentile and 90-percentile values
obtained from the pairs cluster bootstrap with 1,000 draws. By construction, the largest
variability pertains to the VSL estimates. The range and the central VSL estimate are,
however, consistent with the VSL literature (see Viscusi and Aldy 2003, Cropper et al.
2011). We also notice that the value per statistical disability is roughly 40% of the VSL.
Assuming that an irreversible disability reduces life quality by about 60%, this estimate does
not seem far off from those implied by QALY losses associated with severe diseases such as
heart attack or stroke (Salomon et al. 2013). The mean values per statistical injury range
from roughly CHF 1,000 for mild injuries up to CHF 167,000 for severe injuries. This is
consistent with evidence obtained from Swiss labor market data (Ruf and Kuhn 2013).
Figure 3: WTP metrics for different accident severities (in CHF).

Note: Left and right endpoints of the bars indicate the 10th and 90th percentiles of the distribution of the
corresponding WTP metric obtained by pairs cluster bootstrapping.
10

Results of the underlying multivariate probit model are reported in the Appendix.
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5.3

Treatment effects

Overall, the naïve analyst would be quite comfortable with the obtained WTP estimates. In
a next step, we look at the treatment effects which give reasons for concern about the validity
of our results. Models II and III in Table 4 include the treatment factors instead or in addition
to the covariates included in Model I. The comparison of the effect sizes indicates that both
treatment effects are conditionally independent of the covariates. Since the coefficients of the
covariates are hardly altered by the inclusion of the treatment effects, we focus our discussion
on the more parsimonious Model II. Table 5 presents a summary of individual-level mean
WTP values for the four treatment conditions. From this summary table, a large anchoring
effect and a modest effect of partisan cues are apparent. Below, we discuss both treatment
effects in more detail.
Table 5: Mean individual WTP estimates across the treatment conditions (in CHF).

Information
treatment

Control
Partisan Cues
All

Anchoring treatment
Low anchor
High anchor
1.25 (n = 254)
1.96 (n = 249)
0.99 (n = 256)
1.68 (n = 248)
1.11 (n = 510)
1.82 (n = 497)

All
1.55 (n = 503)
1.29 (n = 504)
1.41 (n = 1, 007)

Note: Predicted values of Model II (see Table 4) evaluated at sample means.

We find—and this would have slipped the attention of the naïve analyst who estimated
Model I—that the estimated individual WTP values are strongly correlated with the quantitative scales of the response options. Respondents who evaluated road safety programs A
through D, and thus a choice set whose least and most expensive programs were half as costly
as those implied by the choice set including programs B through E, were on average willing
to pay roughly 40% less per accident avoided than the latter group (CHF 1.11 vs CHF 1.82).
Although there might be some boundary effects related to the fact that approving the most
expensive program does only establish a lower bound on the approving respondent’s latent
WTP, one would have expected a much smaller effect, if any. Moreover, one would have
expected that program C, which was offered to both treatment groups, were chosen equally
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Figure 4: Proportion of chosen road safety programs by anchoring treatment.

Note: Differences in proportions tested using the Exact Fisher test. Significance levels: ‘***’ 0.01, ‘**’ 0.05,
‘*’ 0.1, ‘NS’ non significant.

frequently (Kahneman et al. 1999). As Figure 4 shows, this was clearly not the case. Significantly more respondents (25% vs. 16%) chose program C if it was presented as an option
within the choice set {B, C, D, E} rather than the choice set {A, B, C, D}.

A look at the approval and the WTP curves of the two treatment groups in Panels A and

B of Figure 5 suggests that the respective WTP values are indeed drawn from two horizontally
shifted distributions. Panels C and D plot out counterfactual distributions presuming that
every respondent had faced programs B through E.11 The counterfactual analysis indicates
that the two treatment conditions invoked a relatively stable number of approvals of the least
and second least expensive program, whereas in the high-bid range sensitivity to scope was
more pronounced.
11

The counterfactual distributions were derived by simply doubling the bids of the treatment group who
evaluated programs A through D.
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Figure 5: Anchoring effect on the approval of road safety programs.

Note: Lines indicate linear interpolations within the gray intervals.

The provision of partisan cues had a significant, albeit smaller effect on the choices
over the road safety programs. Compared to the untreated, respondents who had received
information about the political parties’ endorsement of road safety expenditure before making
their choices reduced their contribution by 20% on average (CHF 1.55 vs CHF 1.29). While
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the treatment reduced particularly the willingness to contribute large amounts, it had no
detectable effect on the likelihood of contributing per se. In other words, the treatment effect
reduced the intensive margin but not the extensive margin of the demand for road safety.
In light of the vast literature on framing effects, it comes hardly as a surprise that
partisan cues affected the willingness to contribute to the public good. What is interesting, however, is that the treatment affected respondents with different political preferences
differently. As Figure 6 shows, the provision of partisan cues had no detectable effect on
respondents sympathizing with the two most left-leaning parties (Panels A and B), whereas
it had a pronounced effect on supporters of the two most right-leaning parties (Panels C
and D).12 Treated supporters of the Liberal Party (Panel C) and the People’s Party (Panel
D) significantly reduced their approval of the proposed road safety programs after learning
that their parties had not been in full support of (the Liberal Party) or had blackballed (the
People’s Party) the Via sicura program.
Finally, we controlled for a possible interaction between the two experimental factors.
However, the interaction term is insignificant, rejecting the hypothesis that partisan cues
moderate WTP responses in such a way that they would crowd out the effects of the arbitrary
anchoring on the response scales. One might have thought that if these treatments had any
effect on the respondents’ WTP, then the effect on respondents who evaluated programs B
through E should be more pronounced than on those who evaluated programs A through
D because more is at stake in terms of public expenditure to a good endorsed by left wing
parties and rejected by right wing parties. Testing for an interaction effect between the
partisan cues treatment and the endorsed political party of the respondent did, however, not
result in a statistically significant effect.
12

The treatment had a limited effect on supporters of centrist parties as well, primarily through reducing
their willingness to contribute large amounts.
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Figure 6: Partisan cue effect on the approval of road safety programs by different party
supporters.

Note: Lines indicate linear interpolations within the gray intervals.
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6

Conclusion

We have pursued three objectives in this paper. First, we sought to derive preferences for
road safety based on people’s choices over different levels of safety provision. To achieve this
goal, we refrained from using the standard CV referendum approach which relies on randomly
assigned prices. Instead, we presented survey respondents with credible road safety programs
that could be implemented and would have a similar impact on traffic accidents than what we
described to respondents. Second, we used an anchoring experiment to assess how sensitive
the survey results are to normatively irrelevant factors. Lastly, we used an experiment offering
partisan cues to one treatment group in order to test if any arbitrariness in the responses
can be decreased by offering partisan cues as a substitute for the political views and opinions
available in an actual public voting process. Below, we discuss the main findings relating to
each of these objectives.
By deriving WTP values from people’s preferred quantities of road safety programs, we
linked the provision of a public good to credible individual costs rather than to randomly
assigned bids as in standard CV referendum exercises. Asking about the approval of realistic
policy options is perhaps the most natural way to elicit preferences in a public good context.
Moreover, it is well known that randomly assigned bids may differ sharply from credible
individual costs (Flores and Strong 2007). Our survey instrument had desirable properties
regarding the incentive compatibility of our questions. Indeed, incentives for giving strategic
answering are decreased because the bid amounts are linked to what one would actually contribute in terms of direct taxes on income and indirect taxes on gasoline consumption. Hence,
even if a respondent tried to game the survey, their leverage power was small because the
bids corresponded to their actual contributions would one of the programs be implemented.
This said, the anchoring experiment incorporated into the survey revealed a significant
effect of the response scale on the stated WTP: when all choice options offered decreased
in cost and benefit by 100%, the mean WTP per statistical accident avoided was reduced
by roughly 40 percent points. This figure provides a readily interpretable measure of the
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anchoring effect (Kahneman et al. 1999) and suggests that the demand for safety “travelled”
with the choice set (Drolet et al. 2000). Unfortunately, comparable statistics are scarce
in applied work. The most common experimental sensitivity test in standard referendum
CV surveys is a scope sensitivity test, which examines whether WTP values are affected by
the amount or scope of the commodity provided (Hammitt and Graham 1999). A recent
meta-analysis by the OECD (2012) found that only 199 of 405 VSL studies had reported
a split-sample scope sensitivity test. Of these 199 studies, only 79 passed a weak form
of the test, meaning that the VSL showed at least some sensitivity to the amount of risk
reduction. Since our VSL estimates change less than proportionally with the cost indicated
in the response scale, they are comparable to weakly scope-sensitive estimates. In other
words, while our estimates are affected by contextual factors, they still pass the—admittedly
weak—standards currently applied in the VSL literature.
We offer three possible explanations for the significant anchoring effect (although we
cannot rigorously test them with our data).
The first explanation relates to boundary effects. By assuming a lognormal WTP
distribution, one implies that a fraction of respondents who approve road safety program
k would also approve program k + 1. However, if the observed choices do not follow the
lognormal distribution—perhaps because the empirical distribution is fat-tailed—then one
ends up with differences in the stated mean WTP that are independent of the underlying
preferences.
The second explanation relates to attraction and compromise effects as found in the
experimental studies by Drolet et al. (2000) and Ariely et al. (2003), among others. The
counterfactual analysis presented in Figure 5 suggests that for individual contributions below
CHF 35, respondents might have simply ignored the absolute benefits and costs of a program
and instead applied simplistic choice rules such as ‘choose the least expensive’ or ‘choose the
middle option’. Beyond CHF 50, however, the respondents seemed to pay attention to the
actual benefits and costs associated with a program.
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The last explanation links back to the model of Kamenica (2008), which incorporates
contextual influences into the choice process. The main idea here is that the respondent learns
something about the scope of the public good that helps them in forming their preferences.
E.g., if program E is offered to a respondent, they may conclude that government could
do more than implementing program D to reduce car accidents. The mere knowledge that
more safety could be provided may well offer clues to respondents that are reconcilable with
standard choice theory.
Our third objective was to explore if information about the political support for or
opposition to additional public spending on road safety programs would affect respondents’
preference formation and whether or not this would help them in forming consistent preferences when confronting seemingly irrelevant differences in the response scale. Our results
suggest that some of the treated respondents squared their preference for road safety with
their political identity (Akerlof and Cranton 2010). Indeed, supporters of right-wing parties
who had received the information about their parties recently rejecting a road safety program in Parliament became significantly less willing to contribute to the public good, whereas
supporters of centrist and left-wing parties were almost unaffected by the treatment. The
information provision did not balance the anchoring effect, however. Perhaps if the political
parties had directly endorsed their preferred program—as in a real ballot—the political advice would have had a stronger impact. Understanding how alternative types of contextual
information shapes choices over public goods remains a topic for future research.
We conclude that, while the presented demand function approach is not immune against
anchoring and framing effects, it has several desirable properties, particularly with regard to
incentive compatibility. Specifically, it enables the analyst to determine the median preferred
quantity of the public good, which is strategy-proof. In actual debates about the provision of
a public good, the median preferred quantity may therefore serve as an incentive compatible
benchmark that gauges the political support for a specific policy recommendation beyond
the typical benefit-cost criteria.
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Appendix
Table 6: Individual cost calculation for each of the five road safety programs (in CHF).
A: Individual costs through direct revenue taxes
A
0.00
0.30
0.65
1.25
1.90
2.50
2.85
1.55

How much did you pay in taxes last year?
(1) Paid no taxes
(2) Between CHF 1 and CHF 2,000
(3) Between CHF 2,001 and CHF 6,000
(4) Between CHF 6,001 and CHF 10,000
(5) Between CHF 10,001 and CHF 14,000
(6) Between CHF14,001 and CHF18,000
(7) More than CHF 18,000
(8) No Response (average amount)

B
0.00
0.95
1.90
3.75
5.65
7.55
8.50
4.70

C
0.00
2.20
4.40
8.80
13.20
17.60
19.80
11.00

D
0.00
4.70
9.45
18.85
28.30
37.75
42.45
23.60

E
0.00
9.75
19.50
39.00
58.50
78.00
87.75
48.75

D
0.00
28.80
36.60
44.45
52.25
60.05
67.85
30.35

E
0.00
59.50
75.65
91.80
107.95
124.10
140.25
62.75

B: Individual costs through indirect taxes based on mileage
A
0.00
1.90
2.45
2.95
3.50
4.00
4.50
2.00

How many kilometers did you drive last year?
(1) 0 km
(2) 1 to 5,000 km
(3) 5,001 km to10,000 km
(4) 10,001 km to 15,000 km
(5) 15,001 km to 20,000 km
(6) 20,001 km to 25,000 km
(7) More than 25,000 km
(8) No Response (average amount)
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B
0.00
5.75
7.30
8.90
10.45
12.00
13.55
6.05

C
0.00
13.45
17.10
20.75
24.40
28.00
31.65
14.15

Table 7: Risk-Risk tradeoff elicitation: results of multivariate probit regression.
Death vs
Disability
Coef.

z-stat

Risk-risk tradeoff

-0.066

0.016

Age

***

Disability vs

Severe vs

Moderate vs

Severe Injury

Moderate Injury

Minor Injury

Coef.

z-stat

-0.035

0.006

***

Coef.

z-stat

-0.065

0.037

*
*

-0.002

0.003

-0.002

0.003

-0.005

0.003

Female

0.062

0.094

-0.098

0.089

-0.082

0.090

French

0.046

0.101

0.080

0.095

-0.102

0.095

Italian

0.225

0.141

0.160

0.136

0.410

0.145

Basic education

0.049

0.215

0.608

0.218

***

0.259

Tertiary education

-0.060

0.223

0.504

0.223

**

Income group 2

-0.041

0.114

-0.041

0.109

Income group 3

0.064

0.134

-0.062

0.127

Income group 4

0.093

0.158

-0.010

0.151

Income group 5

0.119

0.214

0.341

0.205

-0.047

0.263

Intercept

-0.068

0.273

atanhrho_12

0.305

0.056

***

atanhrho_13

0.291

0.056

***

atanhrho_14

0.211

0.055

***

atanhrho_23

0.371

0.054

***

atanhrho_24

0.316

0.053

***

atanhrho_34

0.630

0.057

***

No. of respondents
Pseudo-log likelihood

*

z-stat

-0.018

0.006

0.003

0.003

-0.090

0.089

-0.009

0.095

0.267

0.138

0.21

0.003

0.207

0.243

0.217

-0.144

0.214

-0.055

0.108

-0.053

0.107

0.011

0.128

0.105

0.127

0.082

0.151

0.207

0.150

0.533

0.218

**

0.424

0.208

0.548

0.292

*

0.244

0.267

996
-2,449

Note: Dependent variable is log(WTP) interval. Significance levels: ‘***’ 0.01, ‘**’ 0.05, ‘*’ 0.1.
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Coef.

***

***

*

**

Table 8: Risk-Risk tradeoff elicitation: substitution between health endpoints.
Marginal rate of substitution
Central estimate
95%-Confidence interval
F
Death vs Disability (µD )
3.30
0.12-10.73
Disability vs Severe Injury (µD
)
9.22
5.60-11.76
S
S
Severe vs Moderate Injury (µM )
12.40
5.68-36.26
M
Moderate vs Minor Injury (µO )
24.58
13.01-42.06
Note: 95%-Confidence interval based on 1,000 cluster pair bootstrap draws.
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